Volume 47

Issue 3

Article 5

2002

When Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking Privilege: Whether
There Is a Need to Recognize a Clearly Defined Medical Peer
Review Privilege in Virmani v. Novant Health Inc.
Teresa L. Salamon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Teresa L. Salamon, When Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking Privilege: Whether There Is a Need to
Recognize a Clearly Defined Medical Peer Review Privilege in Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 47 Vill. L. Rev.
643 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Salamon: When Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking Privilege: Whether Ther

2002]
WHEN REVOKING PRIVILEGE LEADS TO INVOKING PRIVILEGE:
WHETHER THERE IS A NEED TO RECOGNIZE A CLEARLY
DEFINED MEDICAL PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE IN
VIRMANI V. NOVANT HEALTH INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

An obstetrician-gynecologist in a dark operating room performs surgery through several small incisions in the patient's abdomen with a device
known as a laparoscope. 1 The surgeon inadvertently punctures an artery,
creating an emergent situation, but is able to repair it and the patient
recovers. 2 This scenario will often trigger a peer review investigation,
where members of a committee will review an incident to determine
whether a surgeon's skills and judgment met the standards of care in his
or her practice area. 3 Peer review committees generally comprise selected
members of the medical staff who volunteer to evaluate their peers accord4
ing to hospital bylaws.
Medical peer review began in earnest after 1952, when the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) imposed the requirement
on hospitals as a means to obtain accreditation. 5 Although the peer review process identified physicians who were not practicing in accordance
with the standards of care, there was no vehicle to disseminate this infor1. See MedicineNet, Procedures & Tests, at http://www.focusoncancer.com/
script/main/art.asp?articlekey-944 (last visited Oct. 13, 2001) (describing
laparoscopic procedure, history and advantages). Laparoscopic surgery is a technique to view the inner abdominal cavity with an instrument fitted with a tiny camera. See id. (describing procedure). This device allows the surgeon to perform the
surgery while viewing the patient's internal organs on a television screen. See id.
(describing device used).
2. See, e.g., Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
facts of case).
3. See Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No BenefitIs It Time for a Change?, 25 AM.J. L. & MED. 7, 7 (1999) (defining peer review); see
also Craig W. Dallon, UnderstandingJudicialReview of Hospitals' Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 611 (2000) (outlining hospital
and medical staff responsibility for reviewing quality of care issues by physician
staff members). Privileges, in the context of staff or clinical privileges allow the
physician to provide patient care services in the granting institution, within well
defined limits, according to the individual's professional license, education, experience, competence, ability and judgment. See Dallon, supra, at 605-08 (defining
"privileges" in scope of physician practice).
4. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 12 (describing composition of peer review
boards).
5. See id. at 13 (stating that peer review has become primary method for evaluating physician competence). In order for hospitals to remain accredited the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (UCAHO), formerly
JCAH, still requires hospitals to participate in a peer review process. See id. (explaining function of JCAHO).

(643)
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mation to other providers. 6 This missing link permitted a hospital to revoke a physician's privileges, but allowed the same physician to practice in
another state where no one would be notified of his or her previous
7
misconduct.
Before 1986, regulation and reporting of information obtained as a
result of peer review processes was a function of the states' boards of
medicine. 8 These boards had different standards depending on the state
and often did not share the information that was available to them with
other states or hospital providers. 9 In 1986, Congress passed the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) in response to what was then
known as the medical malpractice crisis.' 0 The purpose of the HCQIA was
6. See Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its
History, Provisions,Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 455, 464 (1990)
(stating that control of incompetence was responsibility of State Medical Boards);
see also H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384-86 (explaining need for dissemination of adverse findings in peer review proceedings).
7. For a discussion of legislative intent in passing HCQIA, see infra notes 3341 and accompanying text.
8. See Horner, supra note 6, at 464 (discussing traditional treatment of incompetent physician). There were many reasons why this reporting system failed, including budget and personnel limitations, increased responsibility for licensure of
non-physician professionals and increased numbers of consumer complaints. See
id. at 464-65 (providing explanation for failures in reporting). One major flaw that
allowed incompetent physicians to continue their practice was the lack of uniformity among the states in requiring hospitals to report disciplinary actions to their
respective state boards. See id. (citing failure of system). Additionally, there was a
lack of an adequate central reporting system where hospitals could obtain information about physicians' qualifications. See id. (citing system's failure).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (stating that both Federation of State Medical
Boards (FSMB) and American Medical Association (AMA) have similar data bases). Not all state medical boards required hospitals to report adverse peer review
decisions. See Horner, supra note 6, at 464 (explaining lack of cooperation between state boards and FSMB). This resulted in data tracking for only the states
that required such reporting. See id. (reporting incomplete investigation of staff
qualifications).
10. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1110111152 (1994) [hereinafter HCQUIA] (stating provisions of Act). The HCQIA, 42
U.S.C. § 11101, specifically states:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need
to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems
that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any
individual State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent
physicians to move from State to State without disclosure of discovery of
the physician's previous damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective
professional peer review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws,
including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional
peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and
protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
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to identify incompetent physicians and to. report them to a central data
bank where this information could be disseminated to other providers.'I
The primary method for identification of these physicians was, and contin12
ues to be, the medical peer review committee.
There are many disincentives for serving on medical peer review com13
mittees, including the discomfort of evaluating one's own colleagues.
To alleviate some concerns and protect peer review physicians, states have
created varying degrees of privileges and immunities. 14 These protections
differ widely from state to state, but generally include some form of immunity from damages in a civil action to members of the peer review committee. 15 Immunities offered under the federal HCQIA differ from these
Id.; see also Homer, supra note 6, at 455 (stating that HCQIA was signed on November 14, 1986 and became fully operational on September 1, 1990).
11. See Horner, supra note 6, at 456 (stating that HCQIA "addresses the problem health care professional by assisting employers in identifying incompetence
and unprofessionalism"); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (stating provisions of
Act).

12. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 13 (discussing peer review as method of
evaluating "quality of physician services" in hospitals in second half of twentieth
century).
13. For a discussion of disincentives for participating in peer review, see infra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of protections for peer review participants, see infra notes
55-69 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/8-2101-2102 (1999) (providing that all
information obtained "shall be privileged, strictly confidential and shall be used
. . . [for] evaluation and improvement of quality care, or granting, limiting or
revoking staff privileges ... [and] shall not be admissible as evidence, nor discoverable in any action of any kind"); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (West 2001)
(providing confidentiality and privilege of peer review committee records, except
when requested by physician whose staff privileges are affected); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH OCC. § 14-501 (d) (2000) (providing statutory exception for actions initiated by physicians aggrieved by committee decision to obtain records for use in
that physician's challenge to peer review conclusions); N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 6527(3)
(McKinney 2001) (providing similar exemption for discovery); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-95(b) (1999) (granting civil immunity to members of medical review committee and privilege from discovery or introduction into evidence of any records
and material committee produces provided that process is performed without
"malice or fraud"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (West 1999) (stating that "proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held in confidence and shall
not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against
a professional health care provider arising out of the matters which are the subject
of evaluation and review by such committee"); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495
§ 5.06 (Vernon 1999) (allowing physician who is denied privileges'to obtain copy
of final decision and "except as otherwise provided ... all communications made
to a medical peer review committee are privileged"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17
(Michie 2000) (providing privilege and freedom from discovery with respect to all
"proceedings, minutes, records or reports" of any "medical staff committee, utilization review committee, or other committee ... that provides a centralized credentialing service, together with all communications, both oral and written,
originating in or provided to such committees or entities"); see also Scheutzow,
supra note 3, at 28 ("[M]ost states offer peer review participants immunity from
civil liability.").
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state protections. 16 In addition, for cases arising in federal court, peer
review protections may be subject to different evidentiary standards and
17
privileges.
In Virmani v. Novant Health Inc.,18 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit examined the standards of privilege in a medical
peer review setting when a physician subject to peer review alleged discrimination in the peer review process. In reviewing this issue, the Fourth
Circuit refused to recognize a federal peer review privilege. 19 This Note
analyzes the medical peer review process in light of the Virmani decision
and its relevance in the context of future peer review challenges when the
legal issue involves alleged discrimination. Part II discusses the history of

peer review and the privileges afforded under the HCQIA, the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) and the split in state and federal court decisions
in applying the peer review privilege. 20 Part III examines the facts of the
Virmani case. 21 Part IV analyzes the court's reasoning for not recognizing

the privilege in the facts of this case. 22 Part V provides a critical analysis of
the Virmani court's conclusions based on the applications of law to these

facts. 2 3 Part VI focuses on the impact that the lack of privileges will have

on the peer review process and its effect on future members of peer review
24
committees.
16. For a discussion of the protections HCQIA provides to peer review members, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
17. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing rule of decision that privileges are to be
determined in accordance with principles of common law and based on "reason
and experience").
18. 259 F.3d 284, 285 (4th Cir. 2001).
19. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285 (stating plaintiff's claim of discrimination because hospital treated non-Indian physicians less harshly than physicians of Indian
origin). In affirming the district court's decision the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fourth Circuit declined to recognize a privilege for medical peer

review materials. See id. at 293 (holding that plaintiffs need for evidence outweighed interest in recognizing privilege for peer review proceeding). The Fourth
Circuit's decision and an earlier Seventh Circuit decision are the only two decisions to have addressed the privilege issue in a medical peer review setting when
the doctor subject to review alleges impermissible discrimination in the process.
See id. ("The Seventh Circuit has squarely addressed the issue of whether peer review documents should be privileged in federal courts ....
We, too, decline to
recognize such a privilege here."). In denying a privilege in Virmani, the Fourth
Circuit also compelled records of peer reviews of all obstetrician-gynecologists
from 1982 through 1997. See id. (discussing affirmance of district court order to
limit scope of Virmani's requests for all peer reviews for any reason).
20. For a discussion of this history and background information, see infra
notes 25-93 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the facts of the Virmani case, see infra notes 94-108 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 109-43 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the analysis, see infra notes 144-86 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact this case will have, see infra notes 187-204
and accompanying text.
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II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Peer Review Process

Medical peer review is a gatekeeping function that is performed by
members of a medical staff to further quality of care. 25 Members of the
medical staff can request peer review for quality care issues, such as an
adverse incident similar to the one described in the Introduction. 2 6 Peer
review is also performed when a physician seeks prospective staff privileges
at a hospital. 2 7 In such instances, the medical peer review committee evaluates the applicant's qualifications, references, licensure, training and
professional conduct. 28 Finally, a peer review committee will generally
29
meet to review current staff members for renewal of medical privileges.
25. See Dallon, supra note 3, at 608-09 (discussing credentialing process). DalIon distinguishes the differences between obtaining medical staff membership and
obtaining clinical privileges. See id. ("[S] taff membership does not assure the grant
of any particular requested clinical privileges."). As a member of the medical staff,
a physician has "a voice in the operation of the hospital" and is also expected to
"supervise, direct and perform" patient services. See id. (describing advantages of
membership to include ability to admit patients and to utilize services provided by
hospital). Staff privileges, in contrast, authorize the services that the physician can
provide. See id. (differentiating types of services requested). Peer review is provided by members of the medical staff as part of their role in supervising the quality of patient care. See id. (stating bylaws delineate role of medical staff to include
"'mechanisms for corrective action, including indications and procedures for automatic and summary suspension of an individual's medical staff membership or
clinical privileges'"). The governing body of the hospital has the final decision in
granting or limiting staff privileges, but allows the medical staff broad discretion
and usually follows their recommendations. See id. at 610 (citing JCAHO Manual
MS.5.1). Credentialing responsibilities arise from this organizational structure to
ensure that practitioners are qualified to provide those services for which they applied. See id. (stating that process "entails obtaining, verifying, and assessing" qualifications of health care practitioner). Privileges, used in the context of staff or
clinical privileges, include the "permission to provide medical or other patient
care services in the granting institution . . . based on the individual's professional
license and his/her experience, competence, ability, and judgment." See Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals: The Official Handbook Manual MS-7, MS.5.1
(1999) (defining credentialing process).
26. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 285 (stating that peer
review followed adverse incident-puncture of patient artery); see also Dallon, supra
note 3, at 611-12 (describing medical staff investigation of physician's privileges
when hospital staff identifies problems such as quality of care provided).
27. See Dallon, supra note 3, at 610-11 (explaining differences in functions of
peer review in distinct contexts).
28. See id. at 611 (discussing application for staff privileges). Staff privileges
are a limitation of the permissions granted to physicians in that they can only perform those services for which they have been credentialed. See id. (stating method
for credentialing). An anesthesiologist for example, would not be credentialed for
performing surgery and conversely, a surgeon would not be credentialed for providing anesthesia. See id. at 608 (discussing limits of staff privileges); see also
Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 13-14 (providing examples of limitations of privileges).
29. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 14 (defining peer review process for existing members of staff).
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When a peer review committee meets to review a quality concern incident, the findings are not always adverse to the physician who is subject to
the review. 30 If the physician is found to have used proper judgment and

maintained the required level of care, but has nonetheless had a bad outcome, it is unlikely that the committee will sanction the physician. 3 1 Conversely, if a committee finds that the physician has performed contrary to
the standards of care required by the physician's specialty, the committee
can recommend to the medical board that the physician's privileges be
limited, suspended pending further investigation or retraining, or
32
revoked.
B.

The Health Care Quality Improvement Act

In 1986 Congress responded to a perceived medical malpractice crisis
by passing the HCQIA. 33 In an effort to improve the quality of health
care, Congress called for a national effort to identify incompetent physicians and to limit their continued practice. 34 Groups that had assumed
responsibility for licensure, such as the various State Boards of Examiners,
had not established sufficient methods to require hospitals to report adverse actions to the boards. 35 In its study prior to approving HCQIA, Congress found:
[G]roups such as state licensing boards, hospitals and medical
societies that should be weeding out incompetent or unprofessional doctors often do not do so. Even when such bodies do act
against bad physicians, these physicians find it all too easy to
30. See id. at 16 (stating case of physician negligence "would not necessarily
result in adverse peer review action").
31. See id. (stating peer review process is designed to monitor individual physician's trends rather than single acts).
32. See Dallon, supra note 3, at 612 (discussing actions taken when quality of
care issues are questioned); see also Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 14 (stating that
"physician [s] may be denied the privilege to provide ... service if quality concerns
have been raised").
33. See generally Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11101-11151 (1994); see also Homer, supra note 6, at 457 (discussing history of
HCQA). The existence of a "'medical malpractice crisis"' has been disputed and
may be a result of increased numbers of claims and sizes of awards. See id. at 45758 (describing factors influencing these increases, including: high public expectation, overestimation of results by physicians and increased insurance rates in high
risk specialties and in certain geographic areas). For further discussion of HCQIA,
see infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
34. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2)
(1994) (discussing congressional findings concerning need to restrict movement
of incompetent physicians); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384 (explaining need to improve quality of health care).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (stating that even when state licensing boards

act, it is not enough to prevent continued practice in other locations).
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move to different hospitals or states and continue their practices
36
in these new locations.
According to congressional testimony, even if a state board revoked a
physician's license, the physician would apply for licensure in another
state. 3 7 The physicians could then continue to practice in the other state,
and cause unsuspecting patients a higher risk of injury and possibly even

death.

38

C.

Impact of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act

HCQIA's mandate was "to encourage good faith professional review
activities of health care entities, [and] to require collection and dissemination to hospitals.., of information concerning certain payments in medical malpractice claims and certain adverse decisions ...
."39 Congress
determined that the peer review setting would be the method of identify40
ing and collecting information on incompetent medical professionals.
To encourage physicians to cooperate in this process, Congress believed it
41
was "essential to provide [physicians with] some legal immunity."
As a second prong of its attempt to address incompetent physician
care, Congress provided for the "dissemination" of gathered information. 4 2 Under HCQIA, dissemination is mandatory rather than discretionary and "requires" hospitals to report to their state medical board peer
review that results in specific disciplinary action. 43 Both hospitals and
state boards are further "required" to forward the information to the Sec36. Id.
37. See Homer, supra note 6, at 464 (discussing twelve witnesses who testified
at hearings); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (stating that "[o]ne witness was a medical director who had hired numerous physicians without being able to discover
even well documented problems-sometimes with tragic consequences").
38. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (explaining that continued incompetence by
small group of physicians has led to death and injury); see also Homer, supra note
6, at 464 (discussing plea bargains made by some physicians to voluntarily relinquish their license or privileges instead of hospital or state licensing board proceeding with formal disciplinary actions).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (defining intent of HCQIA).
40. See id. (stating that purpose of legislation is to improve quality of health
care through physician identification).
41. See id. (explaining that in exchange for participating in process peer review members would receive protection "from damages in suits by physicians who
lose their hospital privileges").
42. See id. at 2 (describing process of tracking disciplinary action). The Act
generally requires disciplinary bodies to report actions to a central location and for
hospitals to request this information before hiring physicians. See Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11135 (1994) (detailing procedures of reporting and requesting information).
43. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11131
(1994) (requiring reporting of adverse actions); see also Homer, supra note 6, at
472 (stating that any professional review actions affecting clinical privileges for
more than thirty days or entities making payment in medical malpractice claims
are reportable).
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retary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services or
its designee. 44 As a means to strengthen data collection, Congress designated the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) as a repository for collecting information on adverse actions against physicians and other
healthcare practitioners. 4 5 The NPDB provides a system for nationally
tracking physicians who have been identified under the reporting
46
regulations.
The peer review committee serves an important function in the wake
of HCQIA because adverse actions taken upon a physician in the course of
the peer review evaluation ultimately are reported to the NPDB.4 7 Physicians whose privileges have been revoked and who have been reported to
the NPDB suffer many losses, including loss of staff privileges. 48 Loss of
privileges prevents a physician from treating current patients, and may impact on a physician's sources for future referrals. Furthermore, it impairs
49
self confidence and damages a physician's reputation in the community.
Ultimately, this loss of privilege could severely limit a physician's capacity
50
for present and future earnings.
Equally important to ensuring quality of care are the peer reviews
themselves; peer reviews can become the last line of defense for the patient who is the recipient of a physician's incompetent care, which might
otherwise go unchecked. 5 1 The peer review committee faces, however, an
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (requiring reports of any paid malpractice claims
over certain amount); see also Horner, supra note 6, at 472 (same).
45. See Horner, supra note 6, at 472-73 (stating that National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB) collects all reported information regarding medical malpractice payments and adverse actions and makes information available to state licensing
boards, other physician employers and hospitals). In addition to its reporting duties, the peer review committee has a concomitant duty to request information
when physicians first apply for privileges and every two years when they renew
them. See id. at 475 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11135). Despite these collection and reporting duties, "[c]onsumers will have no access to the information." Id. at 475-76.
46. See id. at 471 (discussing NPDB's development with cooperation of Unisys
Corporation, American Hospital Association and American Medical Association).
The NPDB became operational on September 1, 1990. See id.
47. See id. (explaining provisions on reporting under Part B of HCQIA).
48. See Dallon, supranote 3, at 613 (describing physician's interest in access to
hospital privileges).
49. See id. at 612-13 (listing negative implications of denial of privileges).
50. See id. at 615-16 (describing how loss of clinical privileges has profound
economic impact on practitioner).
51. See Homer, supra note 6, at 458 (stating that patients rely on hospitals to
monitor quality of care). Homer emphasizes that charitable immunity has been
replaced by the doctrine of corporate liability as the basis for hospital concern
regarding physician competence. See id. at 459. Homer cites numerous cases
where hospitals were found liable in negligence for a failure to ascertain physicians' qualifications before granting privileges. See id. at 459 n.18 (citing cases).
She claims that, as a result, hospitals "[a]nxious to shield themselves from corporate liability ... delegated physician review responsibilities to peer review committees .... ." See id. at 460 (discussing model standards for bylaws). Another
commentator theorizes that hospitals are motivated by patient welfare and that this
motivation arises from the hospital's desire to: (1) fulfill its mission, (2) maintain
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awesome and often conflicting task. 52 Participants have a duty to maintain
the highest level of healthcare through the evaluative process, but the subject of the evaluation may be a colleague, referral source, friend or partner. 53 Participants also fear reprisal in the form of a lawsuit by the
54
physician who is adversely affected by the evaluation.
D.
1.

Protections Afforded to Peer Review Members

Immunity Under HCQIA

Based on the House Energy and Commerce Committee (the Committee) hearings in anticipation of HCQIA's passage, Congress was advised
that physicians facing revocation of their licenses based on peer review
recommendations would respond with civil lawsuits. 55 Fearing that doctors would not perform meaningful peer reviews, Congress decided to provide limited immunity to doctors and hospitals that acted in accordance
56
with due process during peer review proceedings.
Although Congress discussed whether to attach broader protections
to members involved in the peer review process, the Committee ultimately
decided to grant immunity only from "damages against professional review
reputation in the community, (3) discharge a legal duty or (4) fear of liability. See
Dallon, supra note 3, at 616-17 (explaining hospital's interest in patient welfare).
52. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing reluctance of physicians to
evaluate their colleagues).
53. See id. (assessing disincentives for physicians who participate in peer
review).
54. See id. (demonstrating non-legal repercussions of sanctioned physician in
addition to retaliatory litigation); see also Horner, supra note 6, at 461 (stating that
physicians retaliatory measures included suits for defamation, antitrust violations,
interference with business advantage and violations of civil rights or due process);
Thomas C. Riney, HippocratesEnters the New Millennium-Texas MedicalPrivileges in the
Year 2000, 41 S. TEX. L. REV.315, 345 (2000) (theorizing that physicians "who have
had hospital privileges curtailed... will often add a civil fights violation ...to a
lawsuit .... to assure disclosure of peer review records).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384
(stating that physicians sanctioned by peer review often file antitrust lawsuits).
Before 1986 there was an increase in civil antitrust actions against peer review
groups. See Horner, supra note 6, at 461-62 (discussing holding in Patrick v. Burget,
which awarded treble damages of more than $2 million to physician whose privileges were terminated). States offered immunity for peer review members in state
actions, but this did not adequately prevent federal antitrust litigation. See id. at
462-63 (discussing HCQIA's purpose to protect, in part, against antitrust litigation
provided that peer reviewers meet procedural safeguards and are not in economic
competition with subject of review).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 99-903 (discussing scope of immunity). In discussing
the protections afforded to peer review actions, the House Energy and Commerce
Committee [hereinafter Committee] Report continues by noting:
For a professional review action to qualify for protection from damages it
must be taken: in the reasonable belief that it is in furtherance of quality
care; after a reasonable effort to obtain facts; after adequate due process;
in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by facts known.
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bodies" and "for persons providing information to professional review
bodies." 5 7 The bill thus provides qualified immunity if the peer review is
properly conducted according to the established criteria. 58 Immunity is
not available where the peer review committee fails to provide the mini59
mum procedural safeguards outlined by HCQIA.
2.

Privilege Under State Statutes

Unlike the limited immunity afforded under HCQIA, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have enacted a peer review privilege. 60 The
protections offered are not uniform throughout the states but generally
offer immunity from damages in a civil action to those members participating in the peer review. 61 Additionally, the majority of states extends
57. Id. The Committee Report further states:
[T]he Committee considered establishing a very broad protection from
suit for professional review actions. In response to concerns that such
protection might be abused and serve as a shield for anti-competitive economic actions under the guise of quality controls, however, the Committee restricted the broad protection. As redrafted, the bill now provides
protection only from damages in private actions, and only for proper
peer review[.]
Id.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1994) (listing guidelines for review to trigger
immunity).
59. See id. (specifying standard of review for immunity to attach). These procedural safeguards include that the professional review action is taken to further
enhance quality health care, necessary facts are obtained and the subject of the
review has had adequate notice and a hearing and there is a reasonable belief that
the facts warranted the action. See id. (explaining standards for review actions).
60. See Appellant's Brief at 24, Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284
(4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-2423) (discussing legislative recognition of privilege in all
fifty states); see also Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981)
(discussing in dicta that comity compels recognition of state privileges when there
is no substantial cost of federal policies, but holding that in antitrust action where
evidence can only be obtained by documents themselves, court did not extend
privilege); Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1346 (D.N.M. 1998)
(noting significance in fact that forty-six states have statutes that protect work of
medical review committees).
The North Carolina peer review privilege statute, which was at issue in
Virmani, is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999). It states:
(a) A member of a duly appointed medical review committee who
acts without malice or fraud shall not be subject to liability for damages in
any civil action on account of any act, statement or proceeding undertaken, made, or performed within the scope of the functions of the
committee.
(b) The proceedings of a medical review committee, the records
and materials it produces and the materials it considers shall be confidential and not considered public records . . . and shall not be subject to

discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a hospital or a provider of professional health services which results from matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review by the committee ....
Id.
61. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 28 (stating statutes vary as to entities protected and type of protections granted); see also Christina A. Graham, Comment,
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this privilege to discovery of documents and provides for confidentiality of
62
the information obtained from the peer review process.
3.

Privilege Under Armed Services Law

Military physicians who participate in peer review are given a broader
range of privileges and immunities by the Department of Defense than
that provided under HCQIA. 63 Specifically, the statute provides that the
records are "confidential and privileged." 64 Subsection (c) allows disclosure and testimony under a limited set of circumstances. 65 When a provider, however, has initiated a proceeding following an action restricting
clinical privileges, disclosure is permitted for an administrative or judicial
66
proceeding.
Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State and FederalPeer Review Privileges, 30
CUMB. L. REv. 111, 125-26 (2000) (explaining existence of state statutes providing
varying degree of privilege for peer review documents). The author asserts that
the North Carolina state courts "adopted an expansive approach to peer review
privilege" favoring privilege over discovery. See id. at 126 (discussing outer limits
under state peer review statute). She also proposes that if "hospitals and peer review committee members become too accustomed to expansive privileges, and...
a federal question pulls them into federal court, they will likely be ill-equipped to
protect the integrity of their review process." Id. at 130-31.
62. See id. (discussing impact of peer review protection laws). State and federal courts are confronted with the issue of privilege when the plaintiff requests
peer review documents, usually in discovery, and the defendant health care entity
denies the request based on peer review privilege. See, e.g., Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286
(describing motion for compelling peer review documents after hospital invoked
privilege). Under some state statutes, immunity will protect peer review documents while other statutes will allow the physician who has been adversely affected
to discover documents. See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 28-29 (describing varying degrees of immunity offered by state statutes).
63. See 10 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) (providing confidentiality of medical quality
assurance records and qualified immunity for participants).
64. See id. The statute reads in part:
(a) Confidentiality of records.-Medical quality assurance records
created by or for the Department of Defense as part of a medical quality
assurance program are confidential and privileged. Such records may
not be disclosed to any person or entity, except as provided in subsection

(c).
(b) Prohibition on disclosure and testimony.-(1) No part of any
medical quality assurance record described in subsection (a) may be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding, except as provided in subsection (c).
(2) A person who reviews or creates medical quality assurance
records for the Department of Defense or who participates in any proceeding that reviews or creates such records may not be permitted or
required to testify in any judicial or administrative proceeding with respect to such records ....
Id.
65. See id. at (c) (listing A through G exceptions where disclosure is allowed).
66. See id. (describing section (c) (1) (B) and section (G) exceptions to privilege of documents).
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Privilege Under the Veterans Administration

Physicians who participate in peer review for the Veterans Administration are granted privileges and immunities that are also broader than
those granted under HCQIA.6 7 Disclosure is permitted when information
is sought for licensing and accreditation functions and for protection of
health and safety. 68 The privilege, however, is not excepted even to those
69
who are the subject.of the peer review.
E.

Application of Privilege

When a plaintiff brings a state law action implicating privilege of peer
review records, the state court will base its decision on an interpretation of
the state law of privilege. 70 If, however, a suit implicating the peer review
process is brought in federal court on a federal question, the federal law of
privilege will apply. 7 1 For purposes ofjurisdiction, when there is a federal
question together with pendent state claims, courts must decide whether
to apply federal or state law to the claims. 72 Courts, however, will not apply different rules of evidence for each count. 73 If federal law applies,
then the court will follow federal common law of privilege under the
67. See 38 U.S.C. § 5705 (1994) (discussing confidentiality of medical qualityassurance records). The statute reads in part:
(a) Records and documents created by the Department as part of a
medical quality-assurance program (other than reports submitted pursuant to section 7311 (g) of this title) are confidential and privileged and
may not be disclosed to any person or entity except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The name of and other identifying information regarding any
individual patient or employee of the Department .... shall be deleted
from any record or document before any disclosure [is] made.
Id. For a further discussion of the HCQIA, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
68. See 38 U.S.C. § 5705 (b) (1) (citing limited exclusions for disclosure).
69. See id. at (a) (providing all rules pertaining to confidentiality of records).
70. See generally Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675
(N.C. 1999) (basing decision on state law of privilege); HCA Health Serv. of VA v.
Levin, 530 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 2000) (deciding case based on state privilege statute).
71. See FED. R. EvID. 501 (stating that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience"); see also Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group,
198 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Me. 2000) (citing FRE 501).

72. See Marshall,198 F.R.D. at 2 (stating that FRE 501 does not preclude court

from applying state law to federal actions); see also FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing,
"[h] owever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim

or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law").
73. See Marshall, 198 F.R.D. at 2-3 (explaining that in cases where both state

and federal claims exist, law is not provided based upon number of counts); see also
LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 189 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating courts
in federal question cases can apply state privilege law by analogy or for comity).
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FRE.7 4 Nevertheless, federal courts facing questions of privilege in a peer
review setting have the discretion to follow state law of privilege where it
"can be applied with no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policies."7 5 Rather than listing a structured set of privileges, FRE
501 mandates that the court define privilege by applying "common law
76
in the light of reason and experience."
There is no federal common law privilege covering the peer review
process. 7 7 The United States Supreme Court has approved testimonial
privileges under FRE 501 in contexts relevant to the establishment of a
peer review privilege. In Jaffee v. Redmond,78 the Supreme Court upheld a
decision to create a privilege in a patient-psychotherapist relationship despite the Court's disfavor of testimonial privileges. 79 The Jaffee Court
started with the premise that there is always a duty to give testimony when
one is capable of doing so. 80 The Court, however, recognized the need to
protect confidential communications between a therapist and her patient
to further the open and frank disclosure necessary for successful psychiatric treatment. 8 1 Similarly in the medical peer review process, there is a
74. See

FED.

R.

EvID.

mon law); see also 6 JAMES

501 (stating that privileges will be determined by com26.47
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE

(3d ed. 1997) (citing scope of discovery).
75. See MooRE ET AL., supra note 74, at 26.47[3-4] (explaining that court has
discretion to look to state laws for privilege when balancing interest in need for
evidence against equally compelling interest in protecting confidentiality); see also
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980) (discussing impact of state laws
of spousal privilege in developing testimonial privilege law).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 707582 (stating thirteen rules submitted with nine strictly defined non-constitutional
privileges outlined but committee amended to current rule to allow privileges to
be developed by courts).
77. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 50 (stating that "no federal common law
peer review privilege presently exists").
78. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
79. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (stating that privileges may be justified by stronger
public good). In approving the privilege, the Court emphasized an overriding
duty to ascertain the truth as being vital to patient treatment. See id. at 10 (explaining importance of patient-therapist relationship as factor to consider). Jaffee decided that the evidentiary benefit, if the privilege were denied, was modest in
comparison to the chilling effect that might occur if the trust relationship was not
held as confidential. See id. at 12-13 (concluding that policy decisions of states bear
on federal decisions concerning privilege). The Court has drawn on a public policy argument when approving other privileges as well. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) (explaining implication of privileges as "derogation of
the search for truth"); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that privilege must serve public policy).
80. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (discussing justification of privileges). The Court
emphasized its reluctance to create additional privileges based on three centuries
of belief that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." See id. (citing
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940))).
81. See id. at 10 (discussing psychotherapist privilege as one of thirteen privileges proposed by Judicial Conference Advisory Committee to Congress as part of
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence).
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strong public need for physicians to evaluate their peers without the fear
82
of litigation based on their candid assessments.
The Court's creation of the Jaffee privilege was a result of a balancing
test where the apparent need to preserve a communication outweighed
the need for probative evidence. s 3 The Court's balancing test for privileges flows from Trammel v. United States.84 In Trammel, the Court used a

similar balancing test to weigh the need for evidence against the competing interests of spousal privilege. 85 Again, in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC,8 6 the Court relied on the balance test to show that the need to
87
protect privilege was outweighed by the need for probative evidence.
Federal courts have considered the question of peer review privilege
in a variety of ways using the basis of the claim to decide whether privileges
are recognized. 88 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
82. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284
(4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-2423) (supporting need for privilege). Novant described
the work of medical review committees as "life saving" because it is one of the few
ways that clinical practice is evaluated and improved. See id. at 8 (quoting Weekoty
v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1344 (D.N.M. 1998)). Novant added
credence to this argument by indicating that every state has responded to this important public need by enacting statutes to privilege the information shared in the
peer review process. See id. (adding that Congress also established privilege provision for Veterans Administration and Defense Department hospitals).
83. See id. at 8-9 (stating balance of competing interests of privilege over
evidence).
84. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
85. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49-50 (deciding issue of adverse spousal
testimony).
86. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
87. See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 193 (asserting that cost of disclosure is "only
one side of the balance"). The Court quoted a Third Circuit case stating that

"peer review material itself must be investigated to determine whether the evalua-

tions are based in discrimination[.]" See EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 775
F.2d 110, 116 (3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (stating that "an
alleged perpetrator of discrimination cannot be allowed to pick and choose the
evidence").
88. See Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2000) (finding no federal privilege in suit "which alleges abuse of the peer review process");
Patt v. Family Health Sys., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 518, 524-25 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (granting
discovery of peer review documents in gender based discrimination case); Holland
v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 389 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that no
privilege recognized under federal or Iowa law in investigation of employment discrimination); Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 169 F.R.D. 80, 84 (M.D. La. 1996)
(refusing to adopt state law of privilege in Americans with Disabilities Act discrimination case); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (allowing disclosure of peer review documents of other physicians in plaintiff's claim
of racial discrimination); LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (holding that "peer review proceedings are [not] always discoverable
in every case" but allowing discovery in discrimination case); Teasdale v. Main
Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to discover record even if applying state statute rather than HCQIA protections); cf. Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l. Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 390 (3d Cir. 1999)
(affirming summaryjudgment in favor of defendant when plaintiff could not rebut

presumption of immunity under HCQIA); Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp.
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Seventh Circuit in Memorial Hospital v. Shadu? 9 declined to follow state
laws of privilege, stating that the need for evidence is particularly important in an antitrust suit.90 Three years later, the Seventh Circuit, in Marrese
v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons,91 used the same claim-based approach, but the weight of the evidence in the facts of the case was not
enough to allow the court to approve disclosure of documents. 9 2 State
courts, in contrast, have consistently answered the question of peer review
93
based on the state statutes and have recognized the privilege.
2d 1343, 1348 (D.N.M. 1998) (finding in favor of recognizing privilege in selfcritical analysis process). Compare United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth,
970 F.2d 94, 100 (5th Cir. 1992) (balancing test was not for disclosure of evidence
but for Fourth Amendment), with Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons,
726 F.2d 1150, 1160-61 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S.
373 (1985) (discussing means of reconciling competing interest such as in camera
inspection or redaction), and Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th
Cir. 1981) (refusing to extend privilege in antitrust case where evidence is contained in proceedings themselves). But see Burrows v. Redbud Cmty. Hosp. Dist.,
187 F.R.D. 606, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (allowing discovery of peer review documents
subject to protective order in malpractice action); Brem v. Decarlo, 162 F.R.D. 94,
102 (D. Md. 1995) (holding public interest of confidentiality is greater than need
for evidence in defamation suit).
89. 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981).
90. See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061-62 (endorsing balancing approach weighing
"need for the truth" against policy furthered by privilege). The court, recognizing
state privilege and need for comity when consistent with federal practice, distinguished this case from cases in which the plaintiff in a malpractice action would be
able to proceed with the claim. See id. at 1062 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50
F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970)). The court further explained that by applying privilege without regard to the need for disclosure, the result would be to provide
absolute immunity to the participants. See id. at 1063 (discussing effect of holding
hospital disciplinary proceedings privileged). The court concluded that even the
state statute would not be construed to extend the privilege that far. See id. (drawing comparison to cases of conspiracy to fix prices and cases where statements
were made in bad faith).
91. 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
92. See Marrese, 726 F.2d at 1160 (describing participants' reluctance to offer
candid evaluations if names were used as list to be deposed). The court did not
allow the plaintiff to have the membership files after plaintiff stated that he wanted
to use it as a deposition list to determine why his application for membership was
rejected. See id. (stating that "atmosphere of mutual confidence" would be
eroded). The court in dicta discussed methods that the district court could have
used to "reconcile the parties' competing needs," such as in camera examination.
See id. at 1160-61 (describing method district court used as "not well designed to
protect the privacy of the [defendant] Academy's members"). The discovery issue
was never answered. See id. (noting that "files of an association of medical professionals ...

are discoverable in appropriate circumstances").

93. See Miami Heart Inst. v. Reis, 638 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 1994) (maintaining
peer review privilege in defamation action); Eubanks v. Ferrier, 267 S.E.2d 230,
233 (Ga. 1980) (upholding state peer review statute in malpractice case); Stricklin
v. Becan, 689 N.E.2d 328, 331 (111. 1997) (remanding for in camera review to prevent discovery of privileged material in malpractice claim); Bait. Sun Co. v. Univ.
of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 584 A.2d 683, 688 (Md. 1991) (allowing previous ruling
that physician could discover his peer review documents, but court could seal documents from public disclosure); Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex.
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FACTS: THE EVENTS GMNG RISE TO VIRMANI V.

NovANT HEALTH INC.

The Virmani case concerned a physician plaintiff, Dr. Virmani, whose
hospital privileges were terminated after he punctured a patient's iliac artery during a laparoscope procedure.9 4 Dr. Virmani's conduct created a
life-threatening emergency. 95 Following this adverse event, the department chairman informed Dr. Virmani that another physician would assist
him in all laparoscopic cases pending a review. 96 The hospital instituted a
peer review in March 1995 and, five months later in November, terminated Dr. Virmani's medical staff privileges. 97 The committee sent a report to Dr. Virmani stating that 24 of the 102 cases they examined were
problematic. 98
In response, Dr. Virmani filed an action in state court in North Carolina asserting that the hospital had breached its bylaws. 99 The trial court
ordered the hospital to conduct a second peer review using reviewers from
outside the hospital staff. 10 0 On appeal by the defendant, however, the
state appellate court allowed the peer review to remain internal.' 0 ' The

1996) (vacating order of trial court to produce documents privileged under peer
review); HCA Health Serv. of Va. v. Levin, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420 (Va. 2000) (upholding peer review statute in defamation action). In states that have a statute protecting peer review privilege, state courts apply the privilege and withhold the
documents from discovery. See id. at 419 (interpreting plain language of statute to
refuse disclosure of documents without "extraordinary circumstances").
94. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating facts of case). Dr. Virmani had clinical privileges as an obstetrician-gynecologist at both Presbyterian Hospital and Presbyterian Hospital Matthews in 1990.
See id. at 285 (citing facts).
95. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (stating that this was
known complication of surgery, emergency surgery was performed to repair artery
and patient had successful outcome).
96. See id. (discussing hospital's reaction and stating that "appropriately
credentialed physician would assist" Dr. Virmani).
97. See Virmani, 259 F.3d ai 285 (explaining peer review report). The committee reviewed all cases in which Dr. Virmani had been the primary care physician
since August of 1993. See id. (explaining peer review process).
98. See id. (stating review was conducted by OB-GYN committee); see also Appellant's Brief at 3, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (stating that twenty-four problematic
cases included performance of unnecessary procedures, performance of procedures without indication, missed diagnoses and delayed responding to fetal
distress).
99. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285 (discussing nature of Virmani's action).
100. See id. (stating holding of state trial court); see also Plaintiffs Complaint
at 7, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (noting five of six members of first committee were in
economic competition with plaintiff).
101. See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 289
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that internal peer review was appropriate according
to bylaws).
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hospital then performed a second review and Dr. Virmani's privileges were
10 2
again revoked.
Doctor Virmani filed an action in federal court on January 15, 1999
against Novant, the corporation that operated the hospitals, claiming that
the termination of his privileges constituted discrimination against him on
the basis of his race and national origin. 10 3 During discovery, Virmani
requested peer review records from all hospital physicians for the previous
twenty years. 10 4 The hospital sought a protective order based on a North
Carolina statute and pursuant to FRE 501, arguing that the peer review
records were privileged. 10 5 The district court denied the motion, thus declining to recognize a privilege for peer review materials. 10 6 Nevertheless,
because the scope of Dr. Virmani's request was "overly broad," the court
limited the scope of his request to only allow OB-GYN records for the period 1982 through 1997.107 The Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed the
trial court's decision following an interlocutory appeal. 10 8
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In upholding the district court's decision to allow Dr. Virmani to compel production of records related to peer review, the Fourth Circuit de10 9
First, the court
clined to recognize a federal peer review privilege.
addressed the standard of review under FRE 501.110 The court, in a foot102. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285-86 (discussing outcome of second peer review); see also Plaintiff s Complaint at 21, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (claiming that committee recommended to board that plaintiffs privileges be terminated based on
lack of documentation, lack of indications for procedure, poor clinical judgment
and questionable surgical expertise even though plaintiff had no opportunity to
respond to allegations).
103. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285-86 n.1 (citing claim). Doctor Virmani asserted that his civil rights had been violated because he is a member of a racial
minority and the hospital discriminated against him. based on race and national
origin through the peer review process. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 31, Virmani,
259 F.3d 284 (discussing violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985). Novant is a nonprofit corporation operating hospitals in Charlotte and in Matthews and was formerly known as Presbyterian Health Services Corp. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285
(stating that Presbyterian Hospital and Presbyterian Hospital Matthews are known
collectively as "Presbyterian").
104. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286 (discussing Virmani's request for records).
105. See id. (stating Novant's argument). For a further discussion of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131E-95(b) (1999), see supra note 60 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of FRE 501, see supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
106. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286 (discussing outcome of district court).
107. See id. (agreeing with Novant that scope of request was overly broad).
108. See id. at 293 (declining to recognize privilege).
109. See id. at 292-93 (summarizing conclusion of court in Memorial Hospital v.
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981), as only other 'circuit to squarely address
issue of peer review documents in federal court, refusing to recognize a federal
peer review privilege). The Virmani court stated that "[we], too, decline to recog-

nize such a privilege here." Id. at 293.

110. See id. at 286-87 (discussing review of case). The court explained that the
recognition "of a privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is a mixed question
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note, stated that the outcome of this case would have been different if
North Carolina state law applied.1 1 ' Because this case involved a federal
question together with a pendent state claim, the Fourth Circuit followed
its "sister circuits" and applied the federal law of privilege. 112 The court
then stated the rule of evidentiary privileges using the high standard
promulgated by the Supreme Court first in United States v. Nixon"1 3 and
again reiterated in University of Pennsylvania. 1 4 The Fourth Circuit had
not answered the question of privilege for peer review before, 115 and was
reluctant to create or apply a new privilege. 116 Specifically, in addressing
whether to approve a privilege, the court had to answer the question
"whether the interest in promoting candor in medical peer review proceedings outweighs the need for probative evidence in a discrimination
1 17

suit."

of law and fact, which we review de novo." See id. at 286-87 (citing Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 793 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997)). For a further explanation of FRE 501, see supra notes 72-74, 76-77 and accompanying text.
111. See id. at 286 (quoting FRE 501 when state law supplies the rule of decision). The court compared the rules with the N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95(b) and
determined that "if North Carolina law supplied the rule of decision, the materials
would be privileged." Id. at 287 n.3. For a further discussion of the North Carolina statute, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.

112. See id. (explaining that case contains federal question together with pendent state law claim). The court stated that since the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue it looked to other circuits for authority. See id. (citing Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16 n.15 (1996)). The Fourth Circuit followed other circuit
courts and applied federal law. See id. (citing Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 66 (3d
Cir. 2000); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992); von Bulow v.
von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); Mem'l Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1061).
113. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
114. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 287 (articulating importance of disclosing evidence). The court started with the presumption that privileges "are not lightly
created." See id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). The
court also stated that evidentiary privileges refute the "fundamental principle that
the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence." See id. (citing Univ. of Pa. v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)).
115. See id. at 286-88 (discussing de novo review). Following Jaffee, the Court
recognized "a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and
that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule." See id. at 287 (citingJaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1, 9 (1996)).
116. See id. (discussing Supreme Court's admonition not to create or recognize new privilege). The court, in finding an answer to the issue, refused to recognize a peer review privilege in the absence of "sufficiently important interests
[that] outweigh the need for probative evidence." See id. (citing Univ. of Pa., 493
U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
117. See id. (describing issue to be determined).
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The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of Supreme Court PrivilegeJurisprudence

The court first addressed the petitioner's reliance on Jaffee to uphold
11
a peer review privilege because it served a "compelling public end."
The court in Jaffee had concluded that the benefits of a psychotherapistpatient privilege outweighed the evidentiary benefits that would be gained
if the communication were not protected. 119 The Fourth Circuit agreed
with the Jaffee court's assessment that only modest evidentiary value would
be lost in recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 120 Nevertheless, the court distinguished Jaffee for two reasons. First, Dr. Virmani's
claim related to discrimination in the peer review process itself and evi121
dence would be lost if the court recognized a peer review privilege.
Second, the evidence requested in Jaffee consisted of a therapist's notes
recorded while counseling a patient about a prior incident, which formed
the basis of the case. 122 The court ultimately determined that Dr.
Virmani's evidence could only be substantiated by the peer review documents, which addressed the reason why the hospital revoked his
12 3
privileges.
The court next analyzed the similarities between University of Pennsylvania and Virmani, noting that both cases involved an issue of alleged
discrimination in the peer review process.12 4 Influenced in large part by
the Supreme Court's reasoning in University of Pennsylvania, the Virmani
court concluded that the interests in providing evidence that might eradi118. See id. at 288 (discussing Novant's argument that peer review privilege
advances same principles upheld in Jaffee).
119. See id. (stating that most evidence would not exist if psychotherapist-patient communication were not privileged) (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11).
120. See id. (discussing loss of evidence in recognition of privilege).
121. See id. (noting that best evidence to make determination of discrimination can be found in peer review records). The court here distinguished the Jaffee
reasoning because, in Jaffee, the evidence existed not only in the notes from the
counseling sessions between the patient and therapist, but could also be gained
from the actual event, the shooting. See id. (explaining events in Jaffee). In Dr.
Virmani's circumstances, the court concluded that the actual event was the peer
review process itself; this process was the only source of evidence available for Dr.
Virmani to make his claim. See id. (explaining process provides best evidence to
determine if suspension was properly reached).
122. See id. (discussing petitioner's misplaced reliance on Jaffee).
123. See id. ("The best evidence regarding whether Virmani was properly suspended for his medical actions, rather than improperly suspended due to his race
and national origin, is to be found in the process by which the decision to suspend
him was reached.").
124. See id. at 288-89 (noting that decision is "more properly guided by University of Pennsylvania"). In University of Pennsylvania, a professor was denied tenure
and subsequently claimed the decision was based on impermissible race and sex
discrimination. See id. (discussing facts of case). The court employed the Supreme
Court's balancing test and concluded that "the costs associated with discrimination
outweighed the costs that would ensue from the disclosure of peer review materials." See id. (citing Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 193).
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cate possible discrimination outweighed the important interest of "pro125
moting candor" in the peer review process.

B.

The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of State PrivilegeJurisprudence

In answer to the split between state and federal courts, the Virmani
court first analyzed the decisional basis for many of the state court holdings. 126 Notably, the court referred to the Jaffee principle that "existence
of a consensus among the States indicates that 'reason and experience'
support recognition of the privilege." 127 Many of the cases cited by
Virmani granted privilege status to peer review documents based on the
balance of more divergent interests than that posed in a discrimination
case. 128 The court agreed with the holdings in the cases reviewed, but
distinguished the competing interests involved. 129 The Virmani court concluded that many of the state statutes and cases cited were not applicable
in a discrimination suit. 130 The court culminated this analysis with the
reverberating theme of advancing public interests if a discrimination claim
13
were to be successful. '
125. See id. at 289 (discussing balance of interests in University of Pennsylvania).
126. See id. at 290 (discussing state court decisions). For a further discussion
of the contrasting decisions in state and federal courts, see supra notes 88-93 and
accompanying text.
127. See id. (citingJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,12-13 (1996)).
128. See id. at 290-91 (discussing rulings in Memorial Hospital v. Shadur, 664
F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Eubanks v. Ferrier, 267 S.E.2d 230 (Ga.
1980); Baltimore Sun Co. v. University of Mayland Medical System Corp., 584 A.2d 683
(Md. 1991); HCA Health Service of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin, 530 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 2000)).
129. See id. at 291 (stating that reviewed decisions were based on different
concerns). In a discrimination case, the court stated, the claim arises from within
the peer review proceedings. See id. (establishing need in discrimination case for
plaintiff's access to peer review records). In a malpractice action, the claim occurs
from events outside of the proceedings. Therefore, preventing the plaintiff's access to peer review records will not impact greatly on his or her ability to obtain
necessary evidence. See id. at 290-91 (contrasting these types of cases).
130. See id. at 291 (contrasting medical malpractice or defamation actions
with discrimination cases). The court rejected Novant's emphasis on state court
decisions involving medical malpractice and defamation claims as being too dissimilar to discrimination cases. See id. (explaining that crucial issue differs in medical malpractice context because it "is not what occurred at the review
proceeding"). Specifically, the court noted that the former cases reflect a "legislative choice between the competing public concerns" allowing for recognition of
privilege, whereas the later type of case advances both public and private interests
and would weigh against recognizing privilege. See id. at 290 ("[S]tate[s'] policy
decisions .. .do not inform the judgment of this court in this case.").
131. See id. (citing Shadur,664 F.2d at 1062). The court analogized its reluctance to recognize privilege in an antitrust case to a discrimination case where a
successful plaintiff would "'vindicate not only his own right to practice medicine
... ,but also the strong public interest in open and fair competition ....' See id.
(quoting Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062).
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The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of CongressionalIntent

Without answering the question of whether Congress considered the
privilege for peer review records, the Virmani court established that Congress had "considered the relevant competing concerns."1 3 2 The court
agreed with Congress' assessment that physicians would be reluctant to
participate in peer review and, therefore, provided limited protection to
the participants. 133 The court then discussed the protections provided by
Congress in sections 11101-11111 of the HCQIA.1 3 4 Acknowledging these
protections, the court noted that Congress specifically created an excep135
tion to the immunity provisions for claimed violations of civil rights.
The court pointed to further evidence that Congress intended to limit
protection by quoting the HCQIA's sponsor, who stated that "the bill was
13 6
not intended to shield acts of discrimination."
Next, the court refuted Novant's attempt to show that Congress favored a privilege based on broader protections in the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs peer review statutes.13 7 The
court asserted that "Congress will create a medical peer review privilege
38
when it is so inclined.'
1.

The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of Inter-Circuit Case Law

The court rejected Novant's final argument that Fifth and Seventh
Circuit case law supported recognition of a peer review privilege. 139 The
Fourth Circuit interpreted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Shadur as a
132. See id. (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)). Novant
had argued that Congress favored a privilege for medical peer review records
under the HCQIA. See id. (citing lower court's rejection of Congress' intent to
create privilege). The Fourth Circuit decided instead that Congress provided a
limited immunity with an express exception in civil rights cases. See id. at 291-92
(explaining HCQIA).
133. See id. at 291 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1994)). For a further discussion
of this provision, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
134. See id. (discussing provisions of Act). For a further discussion of the
HCQA, see supra notes 10, 55-59 and accompanying text.
135. See id. at 291-92 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)). This provision states
that liability in damages "shall not apply to damages under any law of the United
States or any State relating to the civil rights of any person or persons, including
the Civil Rights Act of 1964..." 42 U.S.C. § 11111 (a) (1). For a further discussion
of the Act, see supra note 10-11 and accompanying text.
136. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292 n.10 (citing Representative Henry A. Waxman in 132 CONG. REc. 33,117 (1986)).
137. See id. at 292 (citing 10 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1998) and 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 5705(a) (1991)). For a further discussion of both provisions, see supra note 6369 and accompanying text.
138. See id. (stating that provisions demonstrate what Congress intended).
139. See id. at 292-94 (citing United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970
F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1992); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d
1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Mem'l
Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5

664

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 643

direct rejection of the peer review privilege in an antitrust action.' 4 0 Further, considering Seventh Circuit case law, the Virmani court interpreted
Marrese as not undermining Shadur, as Novant proposed, but rather as a
narrow holding because there were other "devices that the district judge
could have used to reconcile the parties' competing needs."' 4 1 The court
then dismissed Novant's reliance on the Fifth Circuit's United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth14 2 decision as inapposite, because it was not a case
43
involving the balancing of interests under FRE 501.1
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS
14 4

The Fourth Circuit correctly upheld the district court's decision,'
but for the wrong reasons. The court should have upheld a peer review
privilege under the applicable state statute, thereby adopting the privilege
as federal common law. The court could then examine the documents in
camera and determine if there was evidence of malice or fraud; a finding
145
If
of either would negate the privilege allowing Dr. Virmani discovery.

140. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292 (citing Shadur).
141. See id. at 292 n.l (citing Marrese, 726 F.2d at 1160). For a further discussion of Marrese, see supra notes 88, 92 and accompanying text.
142, 970 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1992).
143. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292-93 (discussing search issue in HarrisMethodist
Fort Worth as Fourth Amendment issue). In HarrisMethodist Fort Worth, a hospital
received notice from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that it
was investigating physician staff privileges and peer review proceedings. See Harris
Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d at 96 (explaining that HHS claimed that Title VI
authorized investigation). The hospital raised two issues in response: first, the
search, which occurred without consent, violated the Fourth Amendment; and second, the physician peer review materials were subject to privilege against discovery.
See id. at 100-03 (agreeing with hospital that consent was for "reasonable search"
and concluding that search would chill peer review process). The district court
held that HHS had conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the Constitution; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 103 (concluding that because search
.exceeded bounds of reasonableness, we need not define the scope of any applicable privilege").
144. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293 (stating holding).
145. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999) ("A member of a duly appointed
medical review committee who acts without malice or fraud shall not be subject to
liability .... ."). For a further discussion of the good faith provision, see supra note
60 and accompanying text. Under the circumstances, privilege under the broad
state law would have precluded Dr. Virmani from discovering his peer review
records as long as the peer review members acted in good faith. See id. The statute's good faith provision will permit in camera inspection of the proceedings to
determine whether good faith was exercised. See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health
Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 680 (N.C. 1999) (describing how hospital attached
documents to legal memorandum sent to presiding judge, but did not file documents in order to preserve state privilege); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1160 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (discussing use of in camera inspection and redaction
to determine merits of case). In Virmani, the state court sealed the documents
pursuant to state law. See Virmani, 515 S.E.2d at 685-86 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-95). The court would not be compelled to extend this immunity if it found
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the process were carried out in good faith, there would be no merit to Dr.
Virmani's argument. 146 In the alternative, the court could have interpreted the statute to allow disclosure of the subject in an adverse peer
147
review, consistent with the approaches of various other states.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit applied the balancing test utilized by the
Supreme Court in Jaffee and University of Pennsylvania to decide whether
the interest in the evidence found in the peer review process was greater
148
than the interest in protecting confidentiality in a discrimination claim.
In discrimination claims the weight of authority favors the need for evidence. 149 But failure to recognize a federal peer review privilege, while
upholding a state statutory privilege, will perpetuate confusion until a con150
sensus is reached between state and federal court decisions.
First, it is still unclear whether federal common law recognizes any
privilege at all for the peer review process or if the privilege is non-existent
only when there is an issue of discrimination. 1 5 1 Second, if the Virmani
that the members conducted a peer review with "malice or fraud". See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131E-95 (a).
146. Cf Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem. Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 380 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating summary of facts).
147. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (West 2001) (providing confidentiality and privilege of peer review committee records, except when requested

by physician whose staff privileges are affected);

MD. CODE ANN.,

HEALTH OCC.

§ 14-501(e) (1) (2000) (providing statutory exception for actions initiated by physicians aggrieved by committee decision to obtain records for use in that physician's
challenge to peer review conclusions); N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 6527(3) (McKinney 2001)
(providing similar exemption for discovery). For a further discussion of state statutes, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
148. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286-87 (discussing balance of interests). InJaffee
v. Redmond, the balancing question was whether "a privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient 'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence .... ' See
518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)). In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the Court weighed the costs that
ensued from disclosure of confidential information in peer review against the
"costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination .... " See 493 U.S. 182, 193
(1990) (discussing compelling interests of both parties).
149. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293 n.13 (citing discrimination cases rejecting
privilege). Federal district courts in discrimination cases have rejected a peer review privilege. See id. (citing court cases). For a further discussion of discrimination cases, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
150. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 1, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (discussing results of holding). Novant argued that "rejection of the privilege in federal question cases effectively eviscerates the protection of the state law privileges."
Id.; see, e.g., Graham, supra note 61, at 138 (concluding that "contradictory court
decisions complicate the understanding of the level of privilege afforded .. . at
both the state and federal level.").
151. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293 (stating that Seventh Circuit declined to recognize privilege). But the Seventh Circuit specifically stated, "[Confidential files]
are discoverable in appropriate circumstances, subject to appropriate safeguards."
See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1161 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); see also Mem'l Hosp. v.
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that peer review privi-
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holding is to be narrowly construed to discrimination suits, then the existence of privilege in other areas based on a balancing test will only be
determined after the case is being litigated. 152 This leaves peer review
committee members no notice as to whether they have the protection of
privilege, as it will only be decided after the fact. 153 Finally, peer review
committees are made up of different members, depending on their specialty and who is active on the committee from year to year.' 54 If the process is in question, then it may not have been a fair assessment in Virmani
to compare the committees who reviewed Dr. Virmani with committees of
1 55
different members during the past twenty years.
A.

Supreme Court Decisionsfor Privilege

In two Supreme Court cases, one limiting and one creating a federal
privilege, the Court deferred to state trends to decide important privilege

issues. 15 6 After examining state court decisions, the Court in Trammel followed these trends and narrowed a federal spousal privilege.1 57 In Jaffee,
lege in malpractice action "will have little impact upon ... plaintiff's ability to
prove a meritorious claim").
152. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Virmani, 259 F.3d at 287 (stating that participants cannot predict whether suit might be brought in federal or
state forum). A physician's dependence on privilege is based on a belief at the
time of his participation that he is immune from liability. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 17
(discussing uselessness of state privilege laws if privilege is not upheld in federal
court); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (discussing need for
certainty of privilege less it be "little better than no privilege at all").
153. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Virmani, 259 F.3d at 287 (explaining outcome will "chill the candor" that is needed for successful peer review);
see alsoJaffee, 518 U.S. at 17 (rejecting balancing component). The Court inJaffee
held that "making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege." Id. The Court also stated that participants in communication must be able
to predict whether it is confidential and protected. See id. (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 393).
154. For a discussion of peer review committees and process, see supra notes
25-32.
155. Cf Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 389 (3d Cir.
1999) (focusing on whether hospital made reasonable effort to obtain facts of matter in discrimination case rather than whether plaintiff is substandard to other
physicians).
156. Compare Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49-53 (1980) (concluding need to narrow privilege), withJaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 (creating new privilege).
157. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49-53 (concluding that spousal privilege should
be modified based on "reason and experience" because of similar holdings in
states). Notably, the Court also emphasized that state trends were especially relevant because laws of marriage are traditionally state mandated. See id. at 49-50
(citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). Similarly, the Supreme Court has
stated that "general health care regulations ... historically [have] been a matter of
local concern." See Appllant's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Virmani v. Novant
Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 707 (1995)).
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however, the Court created a privilege in part because all fifty state legisla1 58
tures favored it.
In Virmani, although the court noted that "the existence of a consensus among the states indicated that 'reason and experience' support rec59
ognition of the privilege," it failed to follow such a line of reasoning.'
The Virmani court instead balanced the need for promoting candor
among peer review members against the interests for evidence in medical
malpractice and defamation claims to decide whether it was appropriate
160
to recognize a privilege.
Contrary to judicial trends, many states have expanded statutes over
the last thirteen years to enhance protection for peer review members. 161
Some states provide blanket protection for the medical peer review process. 16 2 Other states offer broad privilege, but carve out limited excep158. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 14 n.13 (stating that although there is range of
exceptions recognized in states, that range is not enough to "undermine the force
of... unanimous judgment"). The unanimity of the state's had an impact on the
Court's decision to recognize a privilege. See id. (considering creation of privilege
by all fifty states). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, criticized the Court's decision to
create a new privilege. See id. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming Court in past
has adhered to principle rejecting new privileges). As examples of the trend to
reject new privileges, Justice Scalia cited Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50; United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182,
201 (1990); and United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980)). See id. at 19 (enumerating cases limiting privilege).
159. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Jaffee that policy decisions of states have bearing on "whether federal
courts should recognize a new privilege"); see alsoJaffee,518 U.S. at 12-13 (same);
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49-50 (limiting privilege in spousal testimony based on state
law trends).
160. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290 (discussing state case holdings in response to
defendant's argument that states have all recognized some form of peer review
privilege). The court cited Eubanks v. Ferrieras an example of a state statute allowing privilege when a plaintiff requested peer review documents to further a
medical malpractice claim. See id. (citing Eubanks v. Ferrier, 267 S.E.2d 230, 232
(Ga. 1980)); see also HCA Health Serv. of Va., Inc. v. Levin, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420
(Va. 2000) (upholding privilege for peer review records in defamation action because intent is to promote candid discussion to improve quality of health care
system).
161. Compare Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee
Privilege:A JurisdictionalSurvey, 67 N.C. L. REv. 179, 179 (Nov. 1988) (asserting that
"forty-six states now have statutes" protecting peer review), with Scheutzow, supra
note 3, at 28 (claiming that forty-seven states and District of Columbia have state
statutes for peer review privilege in 1999), and Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
(En Banc) at 1, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (stating that peer review privilege has been
adopted by all fifty states).
162. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-143 (2001) (protecting committee proceedings and records from discovery); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999) (providing broad protection from discovery); VA. CODE ANN. §.8.01-581-17 (2000)
(providing privilege for communications from legal discovery "unless a circuit
court, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances
being shown, orders the disclosure . .

").
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tions. 163 The Virmani court stated that under the North Carolina statute,

1 64
privilege would prevent disclosure and the outcome would be different.
Unless the good faith provision of the state statute would allow the court
to permit discovery or at least examine the records in camera, North Caro165
lina's statute maintains a privilege for peer review.

This exemplifies the inconsistency in the application of peer review
166
If
privilege when a case is tried in a state court versus a federal court.
Virmani were tried in certain state courts, the result might be that the defendant would be compelled to turn over the document, even though privilege is recognized, because the statute allows the subject of the peer
review access to his records. 167 Maryland, for instance, recognizes a peer
review privilege, but allows the subject of peer review to discover his or her
records. 168 Physicians participating in peer review in Maryland are thus
163. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0193 (1998) (providing good faith participants
with immunity from retaliatory tort suits and federal antitrust suits); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-501 (2000) (allowing exception to privilege for physician
who is subject of committee's adverse determination); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20
(Law. Co-op. 2001) (providing confidentiality of proceedings and data unless respondent in proceeding requests in writing that information be made public).
164. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 286 n.3 (stating that "[i]f North Carolina law
supplied the rule of decision, the materials would be privileged"). The court did
not address the issue that the North Carolina statute restricts privilege to good
faith actions in part A of the provision. See id. (reviewing statute without discussing
good faith exception).
165. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999) (citing "member... who acts without malice or fraud"); see also LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 191
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. § l11(a) (1)). In LeMasters, a discrimination
case, the court emphasized that the immunity provisions have specifically not been
extended where actions "that violate civil rights laws . . . will not be protected
under this bill." Id.; see-also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990) (citing
EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 775 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1985)) (explaining
that alleged party to discrimination cannot choose what evidence should be submitted for investigation). An aggrieved party would be able to have some relief if
he could demonstrate "that the peer review was not conducted in good faith" so
the outcome here, even under state law, could be identical. See Scheutzow, supra
note 3, at 30 (explaining good faith exception).
166. For a further discussion of inconsistency between state and federal peer
review privilege, see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Bait. Sun Co. v. Univ. of Md., 584 A.2d 683, 687 (Md. 1991)
(explaining exception to peer review privilege under Maryland statute). The court
in Baltimore Sun held that the state statute did not preclude a physician from discovery of his peer review records. See id. (citing holding). The Maryland court, in
its analysis, stated that peer review records are not insulated from either discovery
or admissibility when a physician, who is the subject of the proceedings, files a
claim in a civil action. See id. (citing Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 855 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1988)); see also Brem v. Decarlo, 162 F.R.D. 94, 98 (Md. 1995) (stating
that action initiated by physicians who challenged review committee determination
is only statutory exception to privilege in peer review).
168. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-501 (e) (1) (2000).
Exceptions... of this section do not apply to: (1) A civil action brought
by a party to the proceedings of the medical review committee who claims
to be aggrieved by the decision of the medical review committee; or (2)
Any record or document that is considered by the medical review com-
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protected under the statute; however, the aggrieved party may obtain evidence without a discovery battle, which ultimately allows meritorious
169
claims to proceed.
B.

Reconciliation of Privilege

The Virmani court failed to reconcile the confusion generated by varied interpretations of the peer review privilege. 170 The lack of uniformity
for peer review privilege does not lie solely in the difference between the
federal courts' refusal to grant a privilege and the statutory recognition of
the same privilege; rather, it is compounded by the variation in the scope
of state privilege statutes. 171 The court's refusal to recognize a privilege in
a discrimination case is a vague statement creating the possibility that
there may be a privilege in other contexts; the court, however, failed to
define those conditions. 172 Privilege is only a reliable protection when it
is guaranteed in advance of the communication and is applied consistmittee and that otherwise would be subject to discovery and introduction
into evidence in a civil trial.
Id.
169. See Balt. Sun, 584 A.2d at 687 (stating exception to peer review statute
that records are subjected to pre-trial discovery and admitted as evidence during
civil action).
170. SeeVirmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 291 (acknowledging "no
evidence that state legislatures considered the potential impact on discrimination
cases of a privilege for medical peer review"). The court also stated that because
states' policy decisions reflect different concerns than those at issue they "do not
inform the judgment of this court in this case." Id.
171. See id. at 290 (pointing to policy decisions for peer review privilege in
some states to prevent disclosure in malpractice claims); see also Graham, supra
note 61, at 115 (discussing split in court decisions and inconsistent outcomes due
to discretion given by FRE). For a further discussion regarding the variation in
protection offered in state statutes, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
172. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (rejecting balancing component stating that "promise of confidentiality contingent upon ... judge's later
evaluation ... would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege"). For a further
discussion of Jaffee, see supranotes 78-82 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Teasdale
v. Main Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 693 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing HCQIA as
basis of peer review privilege). In Teasdale, the plaintiff requested peer review documents in a discrimination action against the defendant hospital after the hospital
revoked plaintiff's surgical privileges. See id. (citing facts). The court held that the
HCQIA was not in effect at the time of the peer review, but did provide guidance
about Congress' intent. See id. at 694-95 (explaining additional limits of protection
to information that is not "false or misleading or... not in furtherance of quality
health care"). The court also discussed the importance of looking to state law for
guidance, although it acknowledged that it was not required to adopt it under
FRE. See id. at 694; see alsoJohnson v. Nyack, 169 F.R.D. 550, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("University of Pennsylvania does not eliminate the possibility of a federal medical
peer review privilege."); Brem, 162 F.R.D. at 102 (holding that state peer review
statute "would be thwarted if confidentiality of the proceedings were not protected" in sex and religious based discrimination claim).
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ently. 173 When it is not provided absolutely it is worthless as an incentive
174
to encourage behavior.
By declining to recognize a peer review privilege, the court in Virmani
failed to follow state trends under the Trammel and Jaffee reasoning. 1 75 If
the Virmani court had followed these Supreme Court cases it would have
looked to state and federal recognition of privilege and, finding clear evidence, would likely have approved privilege. 176 Consistent with the doc-

trine of comity, there would be no substantial cost to federal policy in
doing so because Congress has already approved federal peer review privilege in other contexts. 17 7 Accordingly, plaintiffs would have access to evidence because of the good faith exception that allows courts to review
documents in camera.1 78 Furthermore, consistent with many state stat173. SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18 (discussing need for notice); see also Graham,
supra note 61, at 138-39 (concluding that contradictory state and federal court
decisions in privilege determinations complicate this issue).
174. SeeJaffe, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981)).
175. For a further discussion of circumstances under which the federal courts
follow state court trends, see supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. Congress
offered limited immunity under the 1986 HCQIA but later provided that the relevant state statutes should not be restricted by the immunities provided under the
Act. See, e.g.,
Graham, supra note 61, at 119 (noting that 1987 congressional
amendment to subsection (a) of HCQIA stating that "'nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed as changing the liabilities or immunities under law or as preempting or overriding any State law'" would provide greater protection than those
provided by HCQIA); Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 17 (explaining policy reasons for
states to broaden peer review protection). A physician may find it an ethical duty
to evaluate an incompetent peer to improve health care and protect future patients from harm, but may be much less willing to participate in this process if his
appraisal is then used as evidence in a plaintiff's medical malpractice action. See id.
at 18 (explaining ethical concerns as motivation for peer review).
176. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing
United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)). The court in Shadur
emphasized that federal courts should consider state law when assessing privilege
and stated, "'[a] strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereignties
impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished
at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.'" Id. (quoting
King, 73 F.R.D. at 105); see also Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347
(D.N.M.1998) (citing Lora v. Bd. Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). The
court in Weekoty recognized that "if a state holds out the expectation of protection
to its citizens, they should not be disappointed by a mechanical and unnecessary
application of the federal rule." See Weekoty, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.
177. See 38 U.S.C. § 5705 (1994) (providing privilege for peer review proceedings at veteran's hospitals); 10 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) (creating privilege for peer
review documents at military hospitals). For a further discussion of federal instances of peer review privilege, see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
178. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 287 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001)
(explaining court protective order to redact extraneous confidential information);
see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1160 (7th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (explaining in
camera review as procedure to balance privilege against need for evidence); Holland v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 387 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (reviewing
documents in camera to determine whether they fall outside scope of discovery).
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utes, the court could allow disclosure when a physician challenges an adverse peer review outcome. 179 The Virmani court could have recognized
peer review privilege and thereby harmonized the doctrine with other
state and federal statutes. 180 Doing so would have thus guaranteed a reliable and consistent peer review privilege.
Finally, when the Virmani court allowed Dr. Virmani to review documents from the previous twenty years, it exceeded the scope of privilege
for several reasons.' 8 ' First, if non-white physicians were treated more
harshly than white physicians, there would be better ways to establish this
disparate treatment than through the peer review records. 182 Second, the
179. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-445.01 (1993) (excepting from privilege
provider in action arising from discipline of that provider); IOWA CODE § 147.135
(2) (1997) (allowing discovery for "affected licensee"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3715.3 (West 1991) (excepting records by physician in proceedings affecting
hospital staff privileges); cf. TEx. Occ. CoDE ANN. § 160.007 (Vernon 2000) (allowing affected physician to have copy of committee report and final decision).
For a further discussion regarding state statutes, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
180. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293 (discussing holding). Under the proposed
approach, Dr. Virmani would have had access to his peer review documents
whether under state or federal law because he was the subject of the review. See id.
at 291 (noting that both state legislatures and Congress decided to allow victims of
discrimination to pursue claims rather than hold medical review records as privileged). Furthermore, the case could have proceeded on the merits if there was
evidence of discrimination. Cf Pamintuan v. Nanticoke, 192 F.3d 378, 379-80 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing case of physician claiming discrimination in peer review
process).
181. See EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 775 F.2d 110, 117 (3d Cir. 1985)
(suggesting that confidential material regarding other candidates' qualifications
would be point of comparison to measure discrimination). Important to note is
the fact that the court specified that the candidates be of a "similar time frame."
See id. (suggesting time is relevant factor); Pamintuan,192 F.3d at 387-89 (analyzing
need to conduct comparative review of physician who had privileges revoked after
peer review proceeding and who claimed race based discrimination). The court in
Pamintuan agreed, "nothing [that] the statute, legislative history, or case law suggests [that] competency of other doctors is relevant." See id. at 389 (citing Smith v.
Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1994)). Given these facts, the focus of the investigation under the HCQIA was not how the plaintiff measured up against other physicians, but whether "disciplinary actions were justified." See id. (evaluating
physicians based on individual skills rather than as comparison). Similarly, by reviewing records of physicians over twenty years, the court in Virmani will not be
conducting a comparative contemporaneous study. Cf Pamintuan,192 F.3d at 38789 (stating that lack of study does not support discrimination claim). Moreover,
substandard care that was not appropriately sanctioned in prior years does not
necessarily prove or disprove discrimination in a peer review by current standards.
See id. (describing evaluation of physician).
182. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing (En Banc) at 14, Virmani, 259 F.3d
284 (discussing alternative means to access possible evidence of disparate treatment). Novant suggested that the plaintiff use discovery to gather names and
ethnicity of the OB-GYN physicians who have patients with similar complications
and determine whether their privileges have been revoked. See id.; cf Franklin &
Marshall Coll., 775 F.2d at 116 (discussing comparison of qualifications of candidates in academic setting in similar time frame). In Franklin &Marshall College, the
plaintiffs tenure consideration was in 1980, and he requested discovery of tenure
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peer review process is' based on the members comprising the committee;
in twenty years these members change.18 3 Moreover, physicians twenty
years ago, whether white or non-white, were held to different standards of
care than they are today.18 4 Technological advances, surgical techniques,
outcome criteria and mortality and morbidity studies are different and
may make any comparison meaningless.18 5 It would be inequitable to

hold past reviews to today's standards of conduct and still make a true
comparison, unless
18 6
incorporated.

data

of

VI.

past

standards

could

somehow

be

IMPACT

There are three groups likely to be affected by the Virmani court's
decision not to recognize a federal peer review privilege. 187 First, in the
Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs similar to Dr. Virmani possess precedent when
moving for discovery of peer review documents.18 8 The court failed to
hold, as a matter of law, that all physicians adversely affected are entitled
to their peer review records. As a result, future plaintiffs must assert a
189
federal claim because the state statute continues to provide a privilege.
This could result in the same lengthy process that Dr. Virmani himself had
to pursue in order to have access to his peer review records. 190
A second group impacted by the Virmani decision are the peer review
members.19 1 These members may now be even more uncertain as to the
privileges granted during civil proceedings and to peer review documents
decisions for candidates from 1977 to 1981. See 775 F.2d at 112-17 (discussing
dates requested as appropriate comparative base).
183. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 5, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (noting that first
and second peer review had different reviewers); Plaintiffs Complaint at 15,
Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (requesting review by external reviewers).
184. See David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional OrganizationOn Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REv. 583, 597-601 (Summer 1994) (discussing different
rates of development of guidelines). Over a span of twenty years physician practice
standards have changed, as have many technological advances in treatment. See id.
(discussing guidelines, some of which are "rapidly adapted to medical
innovation").
185. See id. (discussing fact that standards of practice for physicians have
changed, as have many technological advances).
186. Cf Pamintuan, 192 F.3d at 384 (discussing use of comparative review
analysis rather than anecdotal studies).
187. See generally Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (illustrating that plaintiff's access to
documents will impact his ability to proceed with discrimination suit). Notably,
physicians who participate in peer review will be impacted either as the defendant
suggested- because "physicians will be reluctant to speak openly"-or, as the
court suggested-because "disparate treatment ceases to occur." Id. at 289.
188. See id. at 288 (stating case is issue of first impression).
189. For a further discussion of state statutes and common law holdings, see
supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
190. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285-86 (citing facts of case).
191. For a further discussion of peer review participants, see supra notes 53-55
and accompanying text.
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as they evaluate their peers. 192 Further, where participants are subject to a
federal discrimination suit, they will have to assume that the least amount
exists for proceedof privilege applies because it appears that no privilege
1 93
ings involving a federal question of discrimination.
Physicians involved in peer review will need to' forecast whether the
subject of the peer review will sue in federal or state court to determine
what degree of privilege might apply. 19 4 The privilege becomes all but
illusory and provides no notice to participants, especially when the privilege is revoked in retrospect but the participants depended on it during
the process.1 ' 5 Had the court in Virmani drawn a line and held that any
physician adversely affected by a decision of a peer review committee
could, as a matter of law, request and receive a copy of the peer review
proceedings, then physicians would likely hold themselves to a higher
standard when evaluating their peers. 196 This higher standard may result
in two benefits.1 97 First, knowing that disclosure will occur, physicians involved in the peer review process would likely be deterred from acting in
bad faith. 198 Second, fewer challenges to the peer review privilege would
arise.199

192. For a further discussion of protections and immunities under state and
federal laws, see supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
193. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293 (declining to recognize privilege for peer
review in national origin discrimination case). For a further discussion of privilege
being applied inconsistently, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
194. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing (En Banc) at 9, Virmani, 259 F.3d
284 (arguing inability to predict where legal claim might arise, which will chill
candor of assessments). For a further discussion of claims arising in different contexts, see supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
195. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (citing need for certainty
for privilege to have meaning). For a further discussion of privileges, see supra
notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
196. See Orentlicher, supra note 184, at 585 (proposing that physicians have
strong need for personal autonomy, resulting in agreement to be "bound by a
professional code of ethics").
197. See id. at 586 (explaining benefits of professional autonomy "'[b]y collectively engaging in the process of enacting and enforcing"' moral guidelines).

198. See id. at 589 (theorizing that physicians accept regulations more readily
if developed within profession rather than imposed by external regulations).
199. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 50-51 (outlining confusion in court's interpretation of privilege). The author cites the deviation between the state statutes
upholding privilege and the absence of federal recognition of peer review privilege. See id. (citing Burrows v. Redbud Hosp. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606 (N.D. Cal.
1998)); Syposs v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 406, 409 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)). But the
author contrasts this with a proposal in the 105th Congress to establish federal
peer review privilege and peer review recognition under federal law by the Veterans Administration. See id. With so much confusion in peer review privilege, parties are uncertain as to disclosure of information during discovery. See, e.g., Riney,
supra note 54, at 348 (stating that civil rights and antitrust complainants often benefit because of liberal discovery standard).
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A third group who could potentially be affected by the Fourth Circuit's decision are the recipients of incompetent care.2 00 It is unclear
whether physicians will adhere to the AMA standards for continued commitment to peer review. 20 1 If physicians continue to effectively participate
in peer review without any self-interest, then the goals of peer review as set
forth in the HCQIA will be addressed without peer review protections and
the quality of health care will improve. 20 2 If, however, the defendants'
assertions in Virmani are correct, then candid and frank discussions will be
chilled and peer review will no longer provide an adequate protection
against incompetent physicians.20 3 Privilege, however, should not be absolute, nor should it serve as a shield to protect physicians who use economic
4
or personal bias to discriminate against competent physicians.2 0
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Virmani, the Fourth Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent disfavoring the creation of new evidentiary privileges and refused to recognize a federal peer review privilege in a case alleging a civil rights violation
for discrimination because of national origin. 20 5 The court did not follow
the decisions in Jaffee and Trammel, which give deference to state legislative
and judicial decisions on the underlying issues. 2 6 Health care is an area
200. See Dallon, supra note 3, at 616 (discussing patient welfare in proper re-

view of physicians). Defendants posited that privilege needs to be recognized for
policy reasons. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir.
2001) (arguing confidentiality is essential to effective peer review). But see LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (refuting defendant's
assertion that permitting discovery undermines quality of health care). In LeMasters, the court held that in a case where a physician claims discrimination she is
entitled to discovery of the peer review proceedings. See id. (stating holding). In
its reasoning, the court stated that there was not "a scintilla of evidence" to show
that discovery of peer review proceedings would dissuade physician participation
in the process. See id. (discussing physician obligation to participate in review).
The court further explained that physicians "feel an ethical duty to the profession
and to the public to keep the standard of health high." Id. The court suggested
that if a hospital could not find volunteer physicians, it could require participation
as a requirement of staff privileges. See id. at 191-92 (discussing ways to obligate
physician participation).
201. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 47-53 (citing statistical data of study showing conflicting views of impact of privilege on physician outcomes).
202. See Orentlicher, supra note 184, at 585 (advancing theory of patients benefiting from physician self-regulation). For a further discussion of physician behaviors, see supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
203. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 287 (stating courts "have found that.., physicians would be reluctant to serve on the committees or would be less candid ...if
they did serve . . .[and] as a result, the quality of health care would suffer").
204. See Riney, supra note 54, at 348-49 (discussing use of peer review to shield
unfair practices).
205. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291 (refusing to recognize privilege).
206. For a further discussion ofJaffe and Trammel, see supra notes 156-59 and
accompanying text.
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that is left to the states to regulate. 20 7 Accordingly, states have recognized
the need for some form of peer review protection in advancing the principles of the HCQIA.20 8 Although Congress did not create a federal peer
review privilege under HCQIA, it did not preclude the states from setting
their own standards. 20 9 If peer' review committees believe that they are
protected by privilege under state law and the HCQIA when they deliberate to advance the quality of health care, then the Fourth Circuit's refusal
to recognize this in federal court has eviscerated the peer review privilege. 210 The vestiges of the privilege do not provide protection to members who serve on peer review committees and only creates confusion in
2 11
the courts.
A better solution is to strengthen the privilege where it is proven to be
2 12
beneficial and create exceptions where it is against policies of fairness.
A clear peer review privilege will protect subjects of peer review, the physician participants and ultimately the consumers who benefit when the qual213
ity of health care is improved.
Teresa L. Salamon
207. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 9, Virmani v. Novant Health
Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001) ("'[Gleneral health care regulation ...historically has been a matter of local concern."') (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 707 (1995)).
208. See Dallon, supra note 3, at 625 (explaining enactment of statutes by state
legislatures to encourage peer review). But see Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 55 (concluding that statistics do not prove that strong privilege and immunity protections
will encourage effective peer review). Scheutzow suggests that peer review is not
enhanced by a simple formula to strengthen the statutory protections. See id. at 5557 (discussing other means to enhance review). Scheutzow states:
[T] he existence of a privilege statute should be reexamined and tailored
to accomplish the intended result. Currently, the strongest privilege statutes have myriad effects. These statutes keep information out of the
courtroom in lawsuits brought against hospitals and peer review participants by physicians challenging peer review decisions .... Legislatures
should determine whether the privilege is warranted in all or any situations .... If the peer review protection statutes are to serve as anything
more than special interest laws that only protect peer review participants,
state legislatures must reassess these statutes and develop new methods to
ensure that health care organizations perform effective and meaningful
peer review.
Id. at 56-57.
209. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292 n.10 (citing 132 CONG. REc. 33,117 (1986)
(stating bill was not intended to override state. acts)). For a further discussion of
health care regulations, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
210. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (stating "[a]n uncertain privilege ... is little better that no privilege at all.").
211. See id. (stating privileges that are applied with variations are equivalent to
having no privileges at all).
212. See Scheutzow, supra note 3, at 47-53 (discussing statistical analysis of data
in peer review process).
213. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 289 (agreeing with defendant that privilege
serves important interests); see also Appellant's Petition for Rehearing (En Banc) at
3-4, Virmani, 259 F.3d 284 (discussing compelling reasons for peer review privi-
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lege). Novant posed several arguments, first, the need to safeguard patients from
incompetent physicians through peer evaluation where discovery of substandard
care can be reviewed. See id. Second, the effectiveness of the process depends on
the willingness of the participant whose only incentive flows directly to the public.
See id. This willingness does not serve the participant and without protection can
in fact harm him or her by virtue of future litigation. See id. Third, confidentiality
is essential, and allowing discovery of proceedings will eliminate the role the process will have in the delivery of quality health care. See id.
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